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The boom-years preceding the “Great Recession” were a time of
rapid innovation in the financial industry. We explore the idea that
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bankruptcy costs facing intermediaries in a costly state verification
problem as a stochastic process, and model the boom-bust in terms
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1 Introduction
In order to connect fluctuations in the financial sector to real economic activ-
ity, most DSGE models of the recent financial crisis and recession introduce
disturbances in the financial sector such as shocks to collateral values or
to credit constraints1. Moreover, this literature typically stresses the role
of contemporaneous shocks arriving in 2007/2008 and pays relatively little
attention to the years leading up to the crisis. In contrast, we show that
changes in expectations about the costs associated with defaults can lead
to movements in credit spreads, asset prices, leverage, aggregate net-worth
and total quantity of credit as well as aggregate macro quantities to simulta-
neously explain both the “great recession” period as well as the boom that
preceded it2. In order to deliver this, we incorporate modeling strategies
from the news shock literature and embed them into a relatively standard
macro model of financial intermediation.
Before discussing the model further, it is useful to consider some of the
boom-bust patterns exhibited by the recent U.S. data. The years leading
up to the “great recession” were a time of rapid innovation in the financial
industry. This period also saw a fall in interest rate spreads, and a boom in
liquidity that accompanied the boom in real activity, especially investment.
We wish to explore the possibility that these were related phenomena. The
linkages are easy to see: the emergence and rapid adoption of new financial
products and practices could have led agents to expect a fall in the overall
costs of intermediation which in turn engendered the flood of liquidity in
the financial sector, lowered interest rate spreads and facilitated the boom
in economic activity. When the events of 2007-2009 led to a re-evaluation
of the effectiveness of these new products, agents revised downwards their
initial expectations regarding the actual efficiency gains, and this led to a
withdrawal of liquidity from the financial system, a reversal in interest rates
and a bust in real activity. Figures 1 and 2 display this boom-bust cycle in
credit and interest rates for the US economy. Figure 1 displays the rapid
rise in the total level of real credit relative to its long run trend and the
subsequent pronounced bust that followed. Figure 2 displays the behavior of
the spread between the yield on BAA bonds and the ten-year treasury bond
over the same period. As is clear from the graph, the spread fell roughly 25
percent below mean levels and then rose to well over 100 percent during the
1See Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gilchrist, Ortiz, and
Zakrajsek (2009), Jermann and Quadrini (2009), Nolan and Thoenissen (2009).
2Beaudry and Lahiri (2009) has a similar interest in linking the crisis to the preceding
period. Unlike us they focus on the lack of productive investment opportunities available
at that time which induce liquidity in the system.
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crisis.
While the role of technical progress and innovation in goods production
has been central to business cycle models in the last three decades, innovation
in the financial sector has not received the same attention in the business cy-
cle literature even though it has been widely discussed in the financial press.
The decade leading up to the financial crisis was especially a time of rapid
innovation in the financial sector. Particularly important to the crisis was
the development of new debt instruments such as residential and commercial
mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), collater-
alized loan obligations, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), structured
investment vehicles and the widespread use of credit default swaps to insure
against default. A brief look at two instruments elucidates this point. For
example, the total amount of asset backed commercial paper doubled from
around 600 billion in January 2001 to over 1.2 trillion in mid 2007. A simi-
larly rapid expansion took place with credit default swaps. According to the
international swaps and derivatives association (ISDA Market Survey 2010),
the market for credit default swaps (CDS) rose from about 900 billion in
2001 to 62 trillion in 2007.
In the context of our macroeconomic analysis, we abstract from the fact
that assets come in many different risk levels and that different investors have
varying tolerance for risk. Instead, following the macroeconomic literature
on agency costs, we model intermediaries as agents that originate a portfolio
of loans, some of which will be defaulted upon. The intermediary expects
to lose a fraction of the value of these loans due to various bankruptcy and
monitoring costs. As part of our abstraction, we view the emergence of new
financial products in terms of these costs: the ability to move risky loans off
one’s balance sheet or the ability to buy insurance against a default event
using a CDS may be interpreted as lowering the expected losses associated
with any default episode. The rapid development and adoption of these new
financial products suggests the possibility that expectations of future losses
associated with defaults may have fallen too much relative to the actual
efficiency gains that these products could deliver. The optimism of lenders
regarding the costs associated with defaults creates expectations that the
return on deposits with financial intermediaries will rise which in turn leads
to a large increase in the amount of funds in the financial system.
To this end, we model bankruptcy/monitoring costs as a stochastic pro-
cess, and interpret shocks to this process as stochastic variation in financial
innovation 3. While it abstracts from the complexity of credit markets, we
3Levin et al. (2004) present a partial-equilibrium representation of a costly-state ver-
ification problem similar to that in Bernanke et al. (1999), using a time-varying cost of
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believe it is useful to think of innovation in the financial sector in terms of
a random efficiency parameter in parallel to the way we think of technical
change in product markets in terms of TFP shocks 4. We interpret the pe-
riod leading up to the crisis as being one in which this parameter governing
bankruptcy costs was low or expected to be below its steady state level. Fur-
thermore, we interpret the widespread scrutiny of the financial sector and its
products that began in 2007 in terms of revision of expectations - that in
the future this parameter would be much higher. We model this change in
expectations by exploiting ideas from the recent “news shock” business cycle
literature that investigates the role of changes in agents’ expectations about
future total factor productivity (TFP), extending the idea here to the finan-
cial sector to consider anticipated changes in bankruptcy costs 5. We find
the case of an unfulfilled news shock especially instructive 6. In our exercise,
agents receive news that this cost parameter will fall at some future date, but
this news turns out to be false when the date finally arrives. In anticipation
of the cost savings, agents flood the system with liquidity, which creates an
investment boom, higher production and employment, a fall in credit spreads
and a rise in asset prices. When the news turns out to be false, a bust ensues
with falling investment and employment along with a sudden rise in credit
spreads and fall in asset prices. Interestingly, the entire boom and bust occur
without any actual change in the cost parameter.
We use a simple and stylized model of financial intermediaries to cap-
ture the essence of the above observations and embed this into a relatively
straightforward real dynamic general equilibrium business cycle model.7 A
monitoring parameter in order to quantify the time-series properties of this parameter
over a panel of 900 firms from 1997Q1 to 2003Q3.
4This distinguishes us from a number of other studies of the financial crisis that focus
on shocks to the system that increase aggregate risk. We do not deny that it may be
useful to think of shocks in the financial sector in terms of an increase in risk but think
it is useful to study different aspects of the crisis in order to gain a full understanding of
what happened.
5See Beaudry and Portier (2004), Beaudry and Portier (2006), Christiano, Ilut, Motto,
and Rostagno (2008), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), Gunn and Johri (2011a), Den Haan
and Kaltenbrunner (2009), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2009), Khan and Tsoukalas (2009),
and Dupor and Mehkari (2009).
6Beaudry and Portier (2004) illustrate a special case where agents first receive news
about a future increase in TFP and then subsequently find out that these expectations
were “overoptimistic”, in the sense that the expected change in TFP fundamentals is not
realized ex-post and therefore unfulfilled.
7The role of the Federal Reserve and monetary policy before and during the crisis has
been the subject of much debate and research. We deliberately choose to work with a real
model in order to keep attention focused on the issues at hand. In this context we also note
our focus on interest rate spreads as opposed to the level of short term interest rates that
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financial intermediary issues debt instruments to households and uses the
proceeds to make loans to entrepreneurs to finance purchases of new capi-
tal. A zero profit condition ties the interest paid to lenders to the interest
rate charged to borrowers but the two are not equal because financial inter-
mediaries must cover the costs associated with those firms that are unable
to repay their loans. A fall in these costs allows the spread between rates
charged to borrowers and lenders to fall. Interestingly, spreads decline in the
boom and rise in the bust even in the absence of any actual movement in the
cost parameter. This occurs because net-worth rises endogenously during
the boom phase and falls during bust independent of changes in the exoge-
nous bankruptcy costs, improving the overall return recovered from defaulted
loans during the boom, and worsening it during the bust. As a result, the fi-
nancial intermediary can charge a lower interest rate relative to the safe-rate
on the loan portfolio during the boom phase as compared to the bust. In
this sense, the model generates fluctuations in spreads that are purely driven
by changes in expectations.
Our model builds on two strands of the business cycle literature. From
the news-shock literature (see Beaudry and Portier (2004)), we borrow the
idea that news about future fundamentals can cause a change in expectations
which result in an immediate change in actions, in advance of any movement
in the fundamental. If the news is later revealed to be incorrect, this leads
to further changes in expectations, and in actions. As a result the news-
shock literature emphasizes the role of changes in expectations in generating
economic fluctuations. While the news-shock literature focuses on imperfect
signals about total factor productivity as a source of business cycles, we ex-
tend this idea to the financial sector - in this particular instance to variation
in expected monitoring/bankruptcy costs as an independent source of busi-
ness cycles variation. Our macroeconomic model of financial intermediation
closely follows the financial accelerator literature exemplified by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Relative to
this literature, our model introduces variations in intermediation costs and
especially variations in expectations about these costs as a source of cycles.
To our knowledge, expectations-driven boom-bust cycles that originate in
the financial sector are a novel contribution of this paper to both these liter-
atures. Thus, in the process of interpreting the great recession in the context
of a boom-bust cycle, we have established a bridge between the literature on
news shocks with that of financial intermediation.
may be more under the control of monetary authorities. It is also worth mentioning that
if policy-makers receive the same information about the efficiency of the financial sector
as all other agents, then there is no reason in our model for them to try and dampen the
response of the economy.
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In the next section we present our model. Section 3 discusses how we
parameterize the linearized model. Section 4 presents both an illustration of
the optimal contract, and simulation results for the response of the model to
contemporaneous shocks, and fulfilled and unfulfilled news shocks. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model
Our model embeds the financial accelerator mechanism of Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999) into an otherwise standard real business cycle model.
Since we will not study the role of monetary policy in this paper, we omit
the New Keynesian elements present in that model. The model economy
consists of a representative infinitely-lived stand-in household, one each of a
single goods-producer, capital-producer and financial intermediary who all
nonetheless act competitively, as well as a unit measure of risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs. The household owns the goods-producer and capital-producer
as well as the financial intermediary. The goods-producer produces output
with labor and capital, paying wages to households and renting capital from
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs purchase capital from the capital producer,
financing their capital with their own wealth as well as from loans from
the financial intermediary. The entrepreneurs’ capital returns are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks observable to the entrepreneurs but not the finan-
cial intermediary, and thus the lending arrangement between the financial
intermediary and a given entrepreneur involves agency costs. The financial
intermediary finances its loans to entrepreneurs by issuing risk-free securi-
ties to households. The capital-producer creates new capital by purchasing
output from the goods market and combining it with existing capital.
In addition to markets for labor and goods, we assume the existence of a
market for household deposits (financial securities), a market for intermedi-
ated loans, and a market for capital goods.
2.1 Household
The representative stand-in household has preferences defined over sequences
of consumption Ct and hours-worked Nt with expected lifetime utility defined
as
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt), (1)
where β is the household’s subjective discount factor and the period utility
function U(Ct, Nt) follows the class of preferences described in King, Plosser,
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and Rebelo (1988).
The household enters into each period with total financial securities At,
earning the risk-less gross rate of return Rdt on its financial securities, receiv-
ing the wage rate wt for supplying hours Nt to the goods-producing firms,
and receiving a share of profits from the capital-producers, goods-producers
and financial intermediary, denoted collectively as Πt. At the end of the pe-
riod, the household chooses its consumption Ct and its holdings of financial
securities At+1 to deposit with the financial intermediary.
The period t household’s budget constraint is given by
Ct + At+1 = R
d
tAt + wtNt + Πt, (2)
where the interest rate Rdt is determined in the previous period.
The household’s problem is to choose sequences of Ct, Nt, and At+1 to
maximize (1) subject to (2), yielding the respective first-order conditions
uC(Ct, Nt) = λt (3)
−uN(Ct, Nt) = λtwt (4)
λt = βR
d
t+1Et {λt+1} , (5)
where λt refers to the Lagrange multiplier on (2).
2.2 Goods-producer
The goods-producing firm produces output Yt according to a constant returns
to scale technology given by
Yt = N˜
α
t K
1−α
t , (6)
where N˜t is total hours-worked, and Kt is physical capital rented from en-
trepreneurs at the rental rate rt. Hours-worked is a composite of both house-
hold and entrepreneurial labor, such that
N˜t = N
Ω
t (N
e
t )
1−Ω (7)
where household labor Nt is acquired at wage-rate wt and entrepreneurial
labor N et is acquired at wage-rate w
e
t .
The firm sells its output in the goods market where it is used as con-
sumption by households or as additions to the capital stock by capital-
producers. Each period the firm chooses Nt, N
e
t and Kt to maximize its
profits Πgt = Yt − wtNt − wetN et − rtKt, yielding the first-order conditions
wt = Ωα
Yt
Nt
(8)
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wet = (1− Ω)α
Yt
N et
(9)
rt = (1− α) Yt
Kt
. (10)
2.3 Financial Intermediary
At the end of each period t the financial intermediary makes a portfolio of
loans to the measure of entrepreneurs, with Bt+1(i) denoting the loan to the
ith entrepreneur, funding this portfolio of loans by issuing securities, At+1,
to the household that promise a risk-less gross return, Rdt+1. For simplicity,
the financial intermediary issues no equity and has no other sources of funds.
As such, in order for the competitive financial intermediary to guarantee the
risk-free return on its household securities each period, it must generate a
total return on its loan portfolio in each aggregate contingency to just cover
its opportunity cost of funds on the household securities. Although loans
to entrepreneurs are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, by
virtue of the entrepreneurs being risk neutral, as in Bernanke et al. (1999)
we can assume that each entrepreneur is willing to bear all the aggregate risk
on its loan and thus make state-contingent loan payments that ensure that
in each aggregate state of the world the financial intermediary achieves an
expected return (where the expectation is over the idiosyncratic returns of
the entrepreneur) equal to the intermediary’s opportunity cost of funds. This
leaves the financial intermediary with only the idiosyncratic risk associated
with individual loans, which it can diversify away by virtue of holding a large
loan portfolio. As such, in each aggregate state in period t, the financial
intermediary’s budget constraint is
ξt = R
d
tAt, (11)
where ξt is the intermediary’s return on its entire loan portfolio after idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty has been realized, and where Rdt and At are predetermined.
We will now first discuss the entrepreneurial technological environment be-
fore detailing the financial contracts between the financial intermediary and
the entrepreneurs.
2.4 Entrepreneurs
Risk-neutral entrepreneurs accumulate physical capital. At the beginning
of each period, entrepreneurs rent their capital Kt(i) to the goods-producer
at rental rate rt. At the end of the period, they sell their existing capi-
tal to the capital-producer at price qt, and then immediately buy back, at
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price qnt , their desired level of capital, Kt+1(i), to hold into next period.
Entrepreneurs finance these capital purchases with their own end-of-period
net-worth, Xt+1(i), and new loans from the financial intermediary Bt+1(i),
such that their financing satisfies
qnt Kt+1(i) = Xt+1(i) +Bt+1(i). (12)
Entrepreneur i’s return to capital is subject to both idiosyncratic and
aggregate risk, such that its ex-post return to holding capital from t to t+ 1
is given by
Rkt+1(i) = ωt+1(i)R
k
t+1 (13)
where ω(i) is a random variable providing an idiosyncratic component to
entrepreneur i’s return, and where
Rkt+1 =
rt+1 + qt+1
qnt
. (14)
is the ex-post return on capital averaged across all entrepreneurs. The market
prices rt, qt and q
n
t and thus R
k
t+1 are functions of the aggregate state of the
economy. The random variable ω is i.i.d across firms and time, has cumulative
distribution function F (ω), and is normalized so that Eω = 1.
To prevent entrepreneurs from self-financing and eliminating the need for
external finance in the long run, we assume as in Bernanke et al. (1999) that
each entrepreneur faces a constant probability, γ, of surviving into the next
period. When entrepreneurs die (and at no other time), they consume their
entrepreneurial equity, cet (i).
Finally, entrepreneurs supply a unit time endowment inelastically to the
good-producers at wage-rate wet .
2.5 Agency problem and debt-contract
As in Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume that the financial intermediary
can observe the average return to capital Rkt but not an entrepreneur’s id-
iosyncratic component ωt(i), unless it pays a monitoring cost. As such, as
illustrated by Townsend (1979), the parties can adopt a financial contract
that minimizes the expected agency costs, in the form of risky-debt where
the monitoring costs are incurred only in states where an entrepreneur fails
to make promised debt payments. Under this structure, as discussed by
Williamson (1987) and Bernanke et al. (1999), the monitoring costs can
be interpreted as “default costs” or “bankruptcy costs”. We assume that
these default costs are a fraction, θt, of the entrepreneur’s gross payout,
ωt(i)R
k
t qt−1Kk(i), however, unlike Bernanke et al. (1999), we follow Levin
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et al. (2004) in assuming that θt is time-varying and follows a stochastic pro-
cess, the properties of which we will describe below. Moreover, we assume
that θt is an exogenous aggregate state that is common to all entrepreneurs,
and which is observable by all agents in the economy.
The specific timing of a typical entrepreneur’s choices and the contract are
as follows: at the end of period t, the entrepreneur chooses its capital expen-
ditures, qnt Kt+1(i) and associated level of borrowing, Bt+1(i), with knowledge
of neither the aggregate state in period t + 1 nor the idiosyncratic realiza-
tion of ω in period t+ 1, ωt+1(i). Conditional on these choices, the terms of
the contract between the financial intermediary and the entrepreneur spec-
ify a contractual non-default state-contingent gross interest rate, Rlt+1 that
ensures that in each aggregate state of the world, the financial intermediary
achieves an expected return equal to the its opportunity cost of funds. In the
event that the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic returns are insufficient to cover
its contracted debt payments, the entrepreneur defaults and goes bankrupt,
handing over all remaining gross returns to the financial intermediary, leav-
ing the gross returns less default costs to the financial intermediary. Note
that given the state-contingent contract structure, the loan rate Rlt(i) will
adjust in period t to reflect the ex-post realization of the aggregate state in
t.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) show that such
a contract can be represented with a cut-off value ω¯t(i) defined as
ω¯t+1(i)R
k
t+1qtKt+1(i) = R
l
t+1(i)Bt+1(i). (15)
If the entrepreneur’s realization exceeds the threshold such that ωt+1(i) ≥
ω¯t+1(i), the entrepreneur pays the financial intermediary the contracted amount
Rlt+1(i)Bt+1(i), keeping the amount ωt+1(i)R
k
t+1qtKt+1(i) − Rlt+1Bt+1(i). If
ωt+1(i) < ω¯t+1(i), the entrepreneur defaults, receives nothing, and the finan-
cial intermediary receives (1 − θt)ωt+1(i)Rkt+1qtKt+1(i). As with Rlt(i), ω¯t(i)
adjusts to reflect the aggregate ex-post realizations of the aggregate state in
period t.
Given these contract details, we can write the financial intermediary’s
expected return on a given loan contract in a given aggregate contingency in
period t+ 1 as
ξt+1(i) = [1−F (ω¯t+1(i))]Rlt+1(i)Bt+1(i)+(1−θt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(i)
0
ωRkt+1qtKt+1(i)dF (ω)
(16)
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Substituting in (15), we can write (16) in terms of the cut-off ω¯ as
ξ(ω¯t+1(i), θt+1) =
[
[1− F (ω¯t+1(i))]ω¯t+1(i) + (1− θt+1)
∫ ω¯t+1(i)
0
ωdF (ω)
]
Rkt+1qtKt+1(i).
(17)
Defining the financial intermediary’s expected share of gross returns Γ(ω¯) as
Γ(ω¯t(i)) = [1− F (ω¯t(i))]ω¯t(i) +
∫ ω¯t(i)
0
ωdF (ω), (18)
and defining G(ω¯) as
G(ω¯t(i)) =
∫ ω¯t(i)
0
ωdF (ω), (19)
we can re-write the financial intermediary’s expected return on a given loan
contract in a given aggregate contingency as
ξt+1(ω¯t+1(i), θt+1) = [Γ(ω¯t+1(i))− θt+1G(ω¯t+1(i))]Rkt+1qtKt+1(i) (20)
where the terms in square brackets represent the financial intermediary’s
share of profits net of default costs. The requirement that the financial
intermediary earn an expected return in every aggregate contingency equal
to its opportunity cost of funds,
ξt+1(ω¯t+1(i), θt+1) = Rt+1Bt+1(i) (21)
then serves as a restriction to define a menu of contracts over loan quantity
and cut-off value for the entrepreneur. Substituting in (12) and (20) we can
then write this as
[Γ(ω¯t+1(i))− θt+1G(ω¯t+1(i))]Rkt+1qtKt+1(i) = Rdt+1 (qnt Kt+1(i)−Xt+1(i))
(22)
which for a given level of net-worth Xt+1(i) defines a menu of contracts
relating the entrepreneur’s choice of Kt+1(i) to the cut-off ω¯t+1(i).
2.6 Entrepreneur’s contract problem
The entrepreneur’s expected gross return, conditional on the ex-post realiza-
tion of the aggregate state but before the resolution of idiosyncratic risk, is
given by
V kt+1(i) =
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1(i)
ωRkt+1qtKt+1(i)dF (ω)−Rlt+1(i)Bt+1(i). (23)
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Substituting in the definitions above yields
V kt+1(i) = [1− Γ(ω¯t+1(i))]Rkt+1qtKt+1(i), (24)
where 1− Γ(ω¯t+1(i)) is the entrepreneur’s expected share of gross returns.
For a given level of net-worth Xt+1(i), the entrepreneur’s optimal con-
tacting problem is then
maxKt+1(i),ω¯t+1(i)Et{V kt+1(i)} (25)
subject to the condition that the financial intermediary’s expected return
on the contract equal its opportunity cost of its borrowing, equation (22).
Letting λt+1(i) be the ex-post value of the Lagrange multiplier conditional
on realization of the aggregate state, the first-order conditions are then
Γ′(ω¯t+1(i))− λt+1 [Γ′(ω¯t+1(i))− θt+1G′(ω¯t+1(i))] = 0 (26)
Et
{
[1− Γ(ω¯t+1(i))] R
k
t+1
Rdt+1
+ λt+1
(
[Γ(ω¯t+1(i))− θt+1G(ω¯t+1(i))] R
k
t+1
Rdt+1
− 1
)}
= 0
(27)
[Γ(ω¯t+1(i))− θt+1G(ω¯t+1(i))]Rkt+1(i)qtKt+1(i)−Rdt+1 (qnt Kt+1(i)−Xt+1(i)) = 0
(28)
where (26) and (28) hold in each contingency, but (27) holds only in expec-
tation.
2.7 Capital-producer
The competitive capital-goods producer operates a within-period technology
that combines existing capital with new goods to create new installed capital.
At the end of each period it purchases existing capital Kkt from entrepreneurs
at price qt, combining it with investment It purchased from the goods market
to yield new capital stock Knkt , which it sells back to entrepreneurs in the
same period at price qnt . The capital-producer faces adjustment costs in the
creation of new capital, and incurs depreciation in the process, so that
Knkt = (1− δ)Kkt + Φ(
It
Kkt
)Kkt . (29)
The capital-goods producer chooses Knkt , K
k
t and It to maximize profits
Πkt = q
n
t K
nk
t − qtKkt − It. Substituting (29) into this expression gives Πkt =
qnt (1− δ)Kkt + qnt Φ( ItKkt )K
k
t − qtKkt − It. The producer’s optimal choices of It
and Kkt then leads to,
qnt =
1
Φ′( It
Kkt
)
(30)
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qt = q
n
t
[
(1− δ) + Φ( It
Kkt
)
]
− It
Kt
. (31)
2.8 Stochastic process θt
The default cost process, θt evolves according to the stationary AR(1) process
ln θt = ρ ln θt−1 + µt, (32)
where ρ < 1 and µt is an exogenous period t innovation which we will define
further below. Note that shocks to θ will cause the spread between interest
rates charged to borrowers and paid to lenders to vary over time so that the
financial intermediary’s zero-profit condition is satisfied.8
2.8.1 News shocks
We want to explore the possibility that agents react to information about
changes in the financial sector in advance of the actual occurrence of these
shocks. This fits in with the idea of expectations-driven cycles in the news
shock literature. Our representation of news shocks is standard and follows
Christiano et al. (2008). We provide for news about θt by defining the inno-
vation µt in equation (32) as
µt = 
p
t−p + εt, (33)
where pt−p is a news shock that agents receive in period t − p about the
innovation µt, and εt is an unanticipated contemporaneous shock to µt. The
news shock pt has properties E
p
t = 0 and standard deviation σp , and the
contemporaneous shock εt has properties Eεt = 0 and standard deviation
σεx . The shocks 
p
t and εA,t are uncorrelated over time and with each other.
2.9 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this economy is defined by contingent sequences of Ct, c
e
t (i)∀i,
Nt, N
e
t (i)∀i, It, At+1, Kt+1(i)∀i, Bt+1(i)∀i, ω¯t+1(i)∀i, Knkt , Kkt , wt, wet ,
rt, R
d
t+1, R
l
t+1(i)∀i, Rkt , qt, qnt , that satisfy the following conditions: (i)
the allocations solve the household’s, goods-producer’s, financial intermedi-
ary’s, entrepreneurs’ and capital producer’s problems, taking prices as given,
8This is reminiscent of the risk-premium shocks used in Amano and Shukayev (2009)
which induce exogenous movements in the spread between risk-free and risky assets. Note
that in our model, the spread between the loan rate and the risk-free rate is actually
endogenous. Indeed as discussed in the results section, movements in this latter spread
can be induced, purely by changes in agents’ expectations.
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(ii) all markets clear, (iii) the resource constraint Ct + C
e
t + q
n
t Φ(
It
Kt
Kt) +
θtG(ω¯t)q
n
t−1R
k
tKt = Yt holds, where
∫ 1
0 Kt+1(i) = Kt+1,
∫ 1
0 Bt+1(i) = Bt+1,∫ 1
0 Xt+1(i) = Xt+1,
∫ 1
0 c
e
t+1(i) = C
e
t+1,
∫ 1
0 N
e(i) = N e = 1 and where all
entrepreneurs choose the same cut-off such that ω¯t+1(i) = ω¯t+1 ∀i, and
therefore Rlt+1(i) = R
l
t+1 ∀i.
Equilibrium in the capital goods market implies that Knkt = Kt+1 and
Kkt = Kt, and equilibrium in the securities market implies that At = Bt.
In equilibrium the financial intermediary’s return on its entire loan port-
folio just covers its opportunity cost of funds, implying that its budget con-
straint holds in every aggregate contingency and after idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty is resolved as
[Γ(ω¯t+1)− θt+1G(ω¯t+1)]Rkt+1qtKt+1 = Rdt+1At+1. (34)
Aggregate net-worth evolves as the accumulated gross returns of surviv-
ing entrepreneurs plus their labor income. Letting Vt be aggregate gross
entrepreneurial returns, we can compute it as the average gross idiosyncratic
returns,
Vt = [1− Γ(ω¯t)]Rkt qnt−1Kt, (35)
which after making substitutions yields
Vt = R
k
t q
n
t−1Kt −
[
RdtBt + θtG(ω¯t)R
k
t q
n
t−1Kt
]
, (36)
so that aggregate net-worth evolves as
Xt+1 = γVt + w
e
t . (37)
Finally, entrepreneurial consumption Cet is equal to the aggregated gross
return of dying entrepreneurs,
Cet = (1− γ)Vt. (38)
For reference later in the discussion of our results, we also define the
equilibrium real risk-free net interest rate as rft =
1
Etβ
λ1t+1
λ1t
− 1, the credit
spread as Rlt −Rdt , and leverage as Lt = q
n
t Kt+1
Xt+1
.
3 Parameterization
In this section we present an illustrative calibration that we will use in the
next section for our simulation analysis. We assign values to parameters us-
ing typical values established in the literature, or where there is a lack of
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precedent, we choose the parameters to match relevant steady state quan-
tities in the model economy with analogous quantities in the data. For pa-
rameters relevant to the financial contract, we follow closely the calibration
of Bernanke et al. (1999). Finally, we solve the model by using standard
methods to linearize the non-linear system about the unique steady state.
Beginning with the parameters common to standard real-business cycle
models, we set the household’s subjective discount factor β to 0.99, implying
a net annualized risk-free interest rate of 4.1%, and implying a quarterly
gross return on household financial assets Rd = (1 + rf )0.25 = 1.0101.
On the production side, we set the share of labor in production, α = .67,
and the depreciation of physical capital, δ to 0.025.
For the capital adjustment cost, our solution method requires that we
need only specify the elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the
investment capital ratio. We follow Bernanke et al. (1999) in setting this to
0.25. In the next section we report results for a version of the model without
adjustment costs.
We use preferences of the form used by King and Rebelo (2000) where
the stand-in representative agent has the preference specification
u(Ct, Nt) =
1
1− σ
{
C1−σt υ
∗(Nt)1−σ − 1
}
, (39)
where υ∗(Nt) =
[(
Nt
H
)
υ
1−σ
σ
1 +
(
1− Nt
H
)
υ
1−σ
σ
2
] σ
1−σ
, where H is the fixed shift
length, and υ1 and υ2 are constants representing the leisure component of util-
ity of the underlying employed group (who work H hours) and unemployed
group (who work zero hours) respectively. For σ > 1 these preferences are
not separable in consumption and leisure, and for σ = 1 they reduce down to
standard separable indivisible labour preferences with log-consumption and
linear leisure. We report results for both cases in the next section. We set
the fraction of the population working on average, fw to 0.6, and the aver-
age household’s share of time allocated to market work Nss to 0.3. In our
impulse-response analysis of the non-separable case, we set σ = 2, which is
within the range studies reported by King and Rebelo. This then yields a
ratio of consumption of those employed to consumption of those unemployed
of 2.26. For our simulations involving separable preferences, we set σ = 1.
We also explored other non-separable preferences which give similar results
and these are available from the authors upon request.
For the parameters associated with the financial contract and the en-
trepreneur, we follow Bernanke et al. (1999) in setting these parameters such
that in steady state, the external finance spread, Rk−Rd, equals 0.005 quar-
terly, leverage, K/X, is approximately 2, and the fraction of entrepreneurs
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defaulting each quarter is 0.076. We set the quarterly survival rate of en-
trepreneurs to 0.9795, the variance of log ω¯ to 0.0727, and steady-state frac-
tion of gross returns lost in default, θ, to 0.115.
For our illustrations we choose default cost shocks that cause the credit-
spread to fall by roughly the same order of magnitude as seen in the US over
the period preceding the financial crisis. Depending on which assets are used
for this calculation, the spread decreased from 25 percent to over 120 percent
between 2002 and 2007 9. Since these exercises are meant to be a quantitative
illustration of the mechanisms in our model, we arbitrarily choose a shock
that reduces the spread by 50 percent when the shock is unexpected. The
size of the shock is then maintained in the following exercises where news
arrives of a future change in θ. This brings us to the persistence of the θ
process. Once again we turn to the persistence in measured credit spreads
to help in parameterization. We measure the credit spread as the spread
between the BAA corporate bond yield and the ten-year government bond
yield measured as percent deviations from the mean value of the spread.
We then regress this measure on its first lag and a constant using ordinary
least squares. Our estimate of the autoregressive coefficient was .9722 with
a standard error of .0143.10. Noting that the credit spread depends on θ and
ω¯ and that the endogenous persistence of the credit spread created by the
model is very small, for the sake of transparency, we set the persistence of the
shock process to .9722. As a result, the simulated credit spread generated
by the model has an AR(1) coefficient of .99 for our parameterization.
For reference later, we refer to the model with non-separable preferences
(σ = 2) and adjustment costs as the “full-model”, and the version of the
model with separable preferences (σ = 1) and no adjustment costs as the
“baseline” model.
4 Results
Recall from our earlier discussion that the optimal contract at the end of
period t is defined by the pair (ω¯t+1,  Lt+1), where ω¯t+1 is a list of cut-off
productivities specifying the state-contingent cut-off productivity level asso-
ciated with each aggregate contingency (
Rkt+1
Rdt+1
, θt+1) in t + 1, and Lt+1 is the
end-of-period leverage, predetermined relative to all t + 1 contingencies, as
a function of the aggregate state in period t. We will often refer to this pair
9Details of these calculations are available from the authors.
10These monthly series were obtained from FRED and the annualized rates were con-
verted to quarterly frequency to be consistent with the model
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as “the contract” in our discussions below. Before we discuss how our model
responds to both contemporaneous and news shocks it will be helpful to un-
derstand how the contract itself responds to expected changes in either R
k
Rd
or in θ while holding the other constant. This is potentially useful because
a shock to θ will have a direct impact on the contract as well as an indirect
impact via the general equilibrium movements in R
k
Rd
.
4.1 Sensitivity of the contract to
Rkt+1
Rdt+1
and θt
Figure 5 shows the results of this exercise, holding θ constant at its calibrated
steady-state value while varying R
k
Rd
around its steady-state value. Similarly,
Figure 4 shows the results holding R
k
Rd
constant at its calibrated steady-state
value and varying θ around its steady-state value. As discussed in Bernanke
et al. (1999), Figure 5 shows that both leverage and ω¯t+1 rise along with
an expected increase in R
k
Rd
. In contrast, Figure 4 shows that an increase
in the cost-of-default, θt, is associated with a fall in leverage and in ω¯t+1.
To understand this latter result, first note that there is an inefficient loss
of surplus in the event of bankruptcy: the contract allocates the surplus
generated by the project between the entrepreneur and the lender but a
fraction of this surplus is lost to both parties in the event of default. The
lender’s zero-profit condition implies that higher leverage is accompanied by
a higher interest rate on loans, which in turn implies a higher probability
of default. A higher cost-of-default, θt, forces the financial intermediary to
cover the lower return on defaulted loans with a higher interest rate for each
level of leverage. Faced with this new menu of leverage and interest rates,
an entrepreneur will prefer to choose a lower combination of leverage and
interest rates which in turn implies a lower probability of default, implying
a lower cut-off productivity. This has the effect of reducing the dead-weight
losses associated with default when default costs are rising.
With an eye on our discussion of impulse responses below, we note that
the effects of varying R
k
Rd
and θ discussed above provide two opposing forces
operating on leverage when θ is shocked. As we will see, the general equi-
librium impact of a fall in R
k
Rd
on leverage can partially offset and sometimes
overturn (such as when adjustment costs are present) the partial-equilibrium
contract tendency for leverage to rise in response to a fall in θ. These results
serve to emphasize the idea that shocks to the cost-of-default parameter act
as a time varying wedge in the relationship between leverage and external
finance premium discussed in Bernanke et al. (1999).
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4.2 Impulse response to cost-of-default shocks
In this section we use a linearized and parameterized version of the model
economy to illustrate how a fall in the default cost, θt, can lead to a large
boom in economic activity and a fall in the credit spread. We begin by first
exploring the response of the model to a contemporaneous shock that reduces
default costs before subsequently moving on to explore the response to news
shocks about future reductions in default costs.
Figure 5 illustrates the response of the model when θt unexpectedly falls
fifty percent below it’s steady state value for our “full model” with adjustment
costs and non-separable preferences. The shock creates an immediate boom
in consumption, investment, output and hours-worked, with the largest im-
pact in the period of the shock and a persistent decline towards steady state.
The boom in real activity is accompanied by a rise in credit, the price of
capital and net-worth while the credit spread and external finance premium
fall on impact.
How should we understand this response? It is useful to separate the
impact period from the rest of the response since the shock is unexpected.
Firstly, in the impact period, certain aspects of the contract are already
determined from the end of the last period: the amount borrowed by the
entrepreneur (conditional on last period net-worth) and therefore leverage.
Since ω¯t is state contingent, it is free to move in the impact period. The fall
in θt in period 1 implies that for a given
Rkt
Rdt
, ω¯t must change to satisfy the
zero profit condition of the financial intermediary. Since the reduction in θt
means that the financial intermediary recovers a larger fraction of the value of
defaulting loans in period 1, it can earn less on its portfolio of non-defaulting
loans and still satisfy the zero-profit condition. As a result, ω¯ falls in the
impact period. This increases entrepreneurs’ share of profits that period, and
increases their net-worth in period 1 slightly. Net worth is further raised by
the rise in the price of capital due to the presence of adjustment costs.
Secondly, beyond the impact effect, since the θt process is persistent,
agents will now expect default costs to be below steady state in the follow-
ing periods. Since agents must choose the amount of new capital and new
borrowing for period 2 at the end of period 1, unlike the impact effect of θt,
this expected change in θt+1 now impacts the optimal contract. In the previ-
ous section we showed that an expected reduction in θ implies an increase in
leverage and an associated increase in ω¯ for a given external finance premium,
Rk
Rd
. The fall in the external finance premium is enough in this instance to
overturn this effect, so that leverage L2 in fact falls. Nonetheless, the increase
in net worth is sufficient to create an increased demand by entrepreneurs for
new capital K2 which is also associated with an increased level of borrowing
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through the financial intermediary. The extra funds are raised by selling ad-
ditional financial securities, A2, to the household, which is willing to supply
the additional savings only at a higher rate of return, Rd2. Note that while
both Rk and Rd rise, the spread between them falls due to the lower default
costs.11 The increased demand for capital is accompanied by an increase
in investment by capital producers in the impact period in anticipation of
the extra demand. The presence of adjustment costs drives up the marginal
cost of producing new capital, thus driving up its price, qt. This yields a
capital gain for entrepreneurs which increases the gross return on capital Rk,
driving up end-of-period net-worth. The extra investment raises the demand
for goods in the impact period which is met by an increased supply from
goods producing firms. The additional goods can only be produced by hiring
more labor since the current stock of capital is fixed in the impact period.
This hiring occurs because the rise in Rd2 leads to a rise in the household’s
marginal utility of income in period 1 relative to that of the future which
shifts its labor supply outwards, resulting in an increase in hours worked in
the initial period. The additional wage income allows both consumption and
investment in financial securities to rise. Finally, combining the equilibrium
zero-profit condition (34) with the cut-off definition (15), we end up with an
expression that relates the credit spread to θ and ω¯,
Rlt
Rdt
=
ω¯t
Γ(ω¯t)− θtG(ω¯t) . (40)
On its own, a fall in θ induces a fall in the credit spread while a fall in ω¯
induces a further decrease in the impact period. As discussed above, in the
following periods, ω¯ rises while θ remains below steady state, thus the two
exert opposing forces on the credit spread which slowly rises.
The above effects are repeated in the future periods while θt remains
below steady-state, albeit at a gradually dampening rate as the demand for
new physical capital falls with the increasing θ. This can be seen clearly in
the figure where investment is at its maximum in the initial period when θt
is at its minimum.
We now discuss the role of capital adjustment costs and non-separable
preferences (σ > 1) to our results. As might be expected, the main impact of
capital-adjustment costs is on investment and the price of capital (which is
fixed in their absence). Without adjustment costs, aggregate macro variables
11The external finance premium would shrink to zero if the default/monitoring costs
were zero. As discussed by Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Levin et al. (2004), a costly-state
verification problem with a zero-cost of monitoring is essentially equivalent to the case of
symmetric information.
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and especially investment rise to higher levels in the impact period but the
qualitative behavior of these variables is very similar to those shown in Figure
5. Since the price of capital does not rise, net worth responds less than shown
here. The additional demand for capital is financed by additional leverage so
the optimal contract picks out higher levels of ω¯ relative to the adjustment
cost case to satisfy the zero-profit condition. While not shown here, these
impulse response plots are available in Gunn and Johri (2013).12
Turning to the role of preferences, since the shock drives a wedge be-
tween the return on capital, Rk and Rd, with standard preferences separable
in consumption and leisure the shock causes negative co-movement between
consumption and investment as the household forgoes consumption in or-
der to increase savings. For the particular preferences we use in this paper,
this case occurs when σ = 1 which yields preferences with log-consumption
and linear leisure. For σ > 1 however, the preferences are non-separable in
consumption and leisure, and imply that the consumption of the underlying
employed households exceeds that of the underlying unemployed household
members. As economic activity increases above steady state, the proportion
of unemployed agents falls so that aggregate consumption rises along with
total hours. The net effect is thus to make the marginal utility of consump-
tion increasing in hours-worked, causing consumption to track closer to that
of hours. As such, the primary purpose of these preferences parameterized
under σ > 1 is to get consumption to co-move with total hours. Impulse
responses for the case of σ = 1, are also available in an appendix. With
the exception of consumption which falls below steady state, the qualitative
movement of all other variables is very similar to those shown here. For
completeness, in the appendix we also show impulse responses to the con-
temporaneous shock to θt for the baseline model (separable preferences and
no adjustment costs).
4.3 News shocks
We now explore how the model economy responds to a change in expectations
about the future costs of default. As before, we will focus on a fall in θ of
the same magnitude, the difference being that agents will now anticipate the
shock and respond optimally to it as soon as the news arrives. In all cases
discussed in this section, the news is received in period 1 about a shock that
occurs after two years (period 8). We begin our analysis with news shocks
that are fulfilled, ie., the news turns out to be correct. Since we have already
12The working paper Gunn and Johri (2013) contains a full set of simulation exercises
exploring the impact of including or excluding capital adjustment costs, as well as various
forms of preferences both for contemporaneous and news shocks.
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discussed the impact of a decline in θ in the previous section, we will focus our
analysis on the response of the model economy to the periods before the shock
is actually realized. As before, our “full model” includes both adjustment
costs and non-separable preferences. We begin with a discussion of this model
and then we show separately the impact of removing adjustment costs and of
working with separable preferences corresponding to our “baseline model”.
As we will see, neither are crucial for generating news based booms, however
they help improve the model response in some ways. Following this, we show
the response of the“full model” to news that turns out to be false, and discuss
how this case may offer some insight into the events of the recent financial
crises in the United States.
Before beginning the formal analysis of the impulse responses, it is useful
to contrast a default cost shock with a more familiar total factor productivity
(TFP) shock. When TFP rises in the future, the economy will have a relative
abundance of goods in the future whereas a fall in default costs has no such
direct effect on loosening the resource constraint of the economy. Indeed, to
the extent that the demand for capital increases in anticipation of a fall in
default costs, the shadow value of goods will rise which will raise the marginal
utility of consumption and, holding other things constant, shift labor supply
out in a manner reminiscent of our discussion in the previous section. This
is the opposite of what happens with a TFP shock. 1314.
4.3.1 A fulfilled news-shock
Figure 6 illustrates the response of our full model to the news that default
costs will fall after two years and the news turns out to be correct. As can be
seen from the figure, the news creates an immediate expansion in economic
activity in the impact period. Investment, hours, output and consumption
jump up in the first period and rise until a peak is reached in the period that
(or one period before) the actual reduction in θ arrives. During this period,
the household increases its investment in the securities of the financial inter-
mediary, which in turn lends more to entrepreneurs who use the extra credit
to purchase additional capital goods. The rise in investment and production
of goods is accompanied by an increase in total hours worked, consumption
and a rise in the price of capital, the net worth of entrepreneurs as well as a
13An implication of this is that the typical mechanisms introduced in the“news shock”
literature to induce co-movement in response to TFP shocks are not needed for default
cost shocks.
14In Gunn and Johri (2011b) we demonstrate how including a particular form of portfolio
adjustment costs can facilitate a news-boom in a model where firms are constrained to
borrow investment and/or their wage bill prior to production.
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fall in the credit spread.
Why does the model economy boom from periods 1 to 7, prior to any
actual change in θ? To clearly illustrate this mechanism, it is helpful to
remove the effect of adjustment costs and non-separable preferences. Figure
7 illustrates the response of our baseline model with no adjustment costs and
separable preferences (σ = 1) to the news that intermediation costs will fall
after two years and the news turns out to be correct. To describe how the
model produces a news-driven boom when agents receives news in period 1,
we will work backwards from period 7 when agents expect that in period 8
the actual shock will reduce θ below its steady state level. Looking forward
one period to period 8 when they expect a lower θ, entrepreneurs will choose
to borrow more to finance new capital purchases for any given level of net
worth while still satisfying the financial intermediaries zero profit condition,
leading to an increase in demand for new capital and new loans in period
7. From consumption smoothing motives, we know that the household will
accept a big change in its marginal utility of consumption only if its reward
for saving jumps up sufficiently. This effect can be seen in the jump in the
return on the household’s assets, Rd, held between period 7 and 8 which
induces the household to trade off its period 7 consumption to fund the
increase in demand for loans. Critically, this combination of a high expected
marginal utility of consumption in period 8 and the high real interest rate
in period 7 imply that the household’s marginal utility of consumption in
period 7 will also be high. This, as a result, creates an expansionary effort
on the household’s labor supply in period 7 as the household desires to raise
its work effect while its marginal utility of consumption is high.
The general equilibrium consequences of the increase in labor supply on
one hand and the increase in demand for capital on the other, lead to an
increase in hours-worked in period 7 at good-producing firms and a corre-
sponding rise in investment and output. The additional labor input raises
the marginal product of capital and in turn the return on capital, Rk. The
rationale for why these variables should also rise above steady state in period
6 and prior can be similarly worked out. Working backwards from period
7, entrepreneurs in period 6 anticipate that Rk will be high in period 7 and
this induces them to demand additional capital for next period as well as
additional loans, given net worth. At the same time, the household expects
its marginal utility of consumption to be high in period 7, and is willing to
postpone consumption to provide the additional loans in return for a higher
Rd, pushing up the household’s real interest rate between period 6 and 7.
Once again, the rise in the marginal utility of consumption pushes out labor
supply in period 6 thus generating a boom in loans, hours, investment and
output as previously discussed. This effect then continues backwards in each
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period until period 1 when the household first receives the news.
While this baseline model delivers booms in response to good news, a
couple of the predictions of the baseline model need improvement. First,
the model predicts that relative to the safe rate, loan rates to entrepreneurs
rise during the boom phase before shocks are actually realized. This occurs
because the extra leverage taken on by entrepreneurs implies higher losses
for the financial intermediary on defaulting loans in an environment where
borrowing costs, Rd are above steady state. The zero-profit condition of
the intermediary is restored by raising loan rates. As a result, the credit
spread is above steady state levels before θ actually falls. The addition of
adjustment costs fixes this problem. With adjustment costs present, the price
of capital rises immediately upon the agents receiving news, driving up the
entrepreneurs’ net worth, and improving their balance sheets. As a result
the financial intermediary can charge a lower interest rate, Rl, relative to its
opportunity cost, Rd, thus lowering credit spreads in the periods prior to the
expected shock actually hitting. Thus, the model endogenously generates a
countercyclical credit-spread and pro-cyclical asset prices, even in advance of
any actual changes in the cost of default parameter, θ. Other variables such
as consumption, hours, investment and total credit behave similarly to the
model without adjustment costs. Second, as discussed above, consumption,
while on a rising path, is below steady state levels over this period. Adding in
non-separable preferences, gives us the“full model”, which as discussed earlier
delivers co-movement in consumption and hours. It is worth noting in this
context that while consumption rises, the marginal utility of consumption is
still above steady state so that our analysis above remains relevant to this
case.
4.3.2 An unfulfilled news-shock
In this exercise, we explore the role of expectations more fully by studying
the case where the news of future efficiency gains turn out to be completely
false in that the gains never materialize. This situation is depicted in Figure
8. The response of the economy in the first seven periods is exactly the same
as for the case where the news turns out to be true. Agents arrive into period
8 expecting to observe a large and persistent fall in default costs but these
expectations turn out to be completely false. In fact, θ remains at the steady
state level and agents must reverse their steps. This reversal leads to a sharp
bust in economic activity, as total hours-worked and output fall below steady
state levels. The sudden bust is especially evident in investment which goes
from being over 4 percent above steady state to below steady state levels.
While consumption falls, the movement is relatively muted. The bust in
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quantities is accompanied with a rapid change in prices: the price of cap-
ital falls in period 8 and pulls down the net worth of entrepreneurs. As a
result there is a sharp increase in the credit spread from being roughly 4
percent below steady state to over 13 percent above steady state, reflecting
the sudden deterioration in the quality of the entrepreneurs’ balance sheets.
Overall Figure 8 is an illustration of a complete boom-bust cycle which is
driven entirely by expectations of future intermediation efficiency gains that
are never realized. The bust lasts for a number of years and the economy is
still operating below steady state levels roughly ten years or forty quarters
after the news is first received. We find this scenario particularly interesting
because a change in expectations is the only source of a large and persistent
endogenous movement in the credit spread and in the price of capital with-
out any underlying movement in the actual default-cost parameter. In the
introduction we showed plots of interest rate spreads and credit just before
and during the recession. Figures 1 and 2 showed that the fall in spreads
was accompanied by an expansion of credit in the economy in the period be-
fore the financial crisis. This was followed by the crisis period during which
spreads spiked sharply and credit plummeted. This inverse relationship be-
tween spreads and credit is also delivered by the model as can be seen in
Figure 8.
5 Conclusions
The years preceding the financial crisis were a period of rapid technologi-
cal change in the financial sector when a number of new financial products
as well as practices were introduced. Given the novelty of many of these
innovations and speed of adoption, it is likely that agents had very high
expectations of the financial efficiencies resulting from these developments.
These over-optimistic expectations may have been tested by the events of
2007-2008 leading to a sharp downward revision in the expected efficacy of
these products. At the same time, concerns regarding the stability of the
financial system may have also contributed to the expectation that interme-
diation costs would be much higher going forward, than previously expected.
Our model attempts to provide a stylized economy that can help understand
the consequences of these changes in expectations about intermediation costs.
In order to explore these consequences we modify a real business cycle
model in the costly-state-verification tradition in which financial intermedi-
aries originate a portfolio of loans, some of which will be defaulted upon. In
this literature, intermediaries face monitoring/bankruptcy cost when defaults
occur. In our setup, these costs are modeled as a time-varying exogenous
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process about which agents receive news in advance of any change. The ar-
rival of news causes changes in agents expectations about the future value of
these default costs and this leads to immediate actions in anticipation of the
changes to come. We show that the arrival of news that costs will fall in the
future causes financial contracts to be modified which leads to an immediate
expansion in liquidity in the financial system, a fall in credit spreads, a rise
in asset values and net worth as well as a boom in economic activity, all of
which precedes any actual change in these intermediation costs. Likewise,
expected increases in costs would lead to a credit contraction, higher spreads
and a fall in economic activity. We go on to show that an expectations driven
boom in production and credit can subsequently be followed by a bust if the
expectations turn out to be false. Consistent with the model, the negative
co-movement of credit spreads on the one hand and total credit and economic
activity on the other was part of the recent boom-bust cycle in the U.S.
The events of 2007-2009 have cast a spotlight on the financial sector
and revealed a complex set of phenomena that contributed to the worst
recession in the post-war era. We have tried to contribute to our overall
understanding of what happened in this period by focusing on one possible
source of the great expansion in liquidity that preceded the recession and
its eventual decline. Our explanation of this liquidity boom has focused on
overoptimistic expectations of efficiency gains in the financial sector in the
context of innovation whereas much of the discussions in the financial press
have focused on the effect of low policy rates such as the Federal Funds
Rate. Interestingly, our model generates declines in interest rate spreads
during the boom phase followed by sharp increases in these spreads once the
bust begins even in the absence of any monetary authority in the model. We
note that many spreads in this period were far less under the control of the
monetary authority and sometimes moved against the prevailing direction
of the policy rate which suggests that they may have been susceptible to
changes in expectations. Developing a monetary version of the model which
can incorporate the behavior of the fed so that predictions can be made about
the level of interest rates would be one interesting avenue for future work.
Having established the theoretical possibility that changes in expectations
about bankruptcy costs (and more generally intermediation costs) can be a
potent source of business cycles, another logical future step is to identify these
shocks in the data and empirically evaluate their contribution to fluctuations
in macroeconomic quantities relative to more traditional disturbances such
as shocks to policy and to total factor productivity.
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Figure 1: Total Real Credit Market Debt. Total real credit market debt was
obtained from the FRED database using the series TCMDO and dividing
by the consumer price index CPIAUCSL. Series are percent deviations from
trend.
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Figure 2: Credit Spread. The credit spread is defined here as the difference
in the yield on BAA rated corporate bonds and the 10-Year Treasury Con-
stant Maturity Rate both obtained from FRED. The data were converted to
quarterly frequency and percentage deviations from mean values are reported
here.
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Figure 3: Optimal contract: leverage (L) & cut-off (ω¯) vs. external finance
premium (R
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) holding default cost (θ) constant
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Figure 4: Optimal contract: leverage (L) & cut-off (ω¯) vs. default cost (θ)
holding the external finance premium (R
k
Rd
) constant.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions, full-model. Contemporaneous reduc-
tion in default cost, θ, in period 1.
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions, full-model. News received in period 1
about reduction in default cost, θ, in period 8 that actually occurs in period
8.
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions, baseline model (no adjustment costs,
separable preferences). News received in period 1 about a reduction in default
cost, θ, in period 8 that actually occurs in period 8.
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions, full model. News received in period
1 about a reduction in default cost, θ, in period 8, but then no reduction
occurs in period 8.
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